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NATO Needs Deterrence and Dialogue 
Defining the New Balance in View of the Warsaw Summit 
Claudia Major and Jeffrey Rathke 
Deterrence is back in Europe. As NATO approaches its July summit in Warsaw, Allies 
are adapting this concept to the new security settings in place in Europe since the 2014 
crisis in Ukraine. Yet, deterrence is intrinsically connected to dialogue: these are the 
two pillars of NATO’s strategy, as defined in the 1967 Harmel Report. Consequently, in 
a security environment in which Russia uses military force to coerce neighbours and 
violates international law by redrawing borders, NATO needs to find a new balance 
between deterrence and dialogue to safeguard security in Europe. NATO rightly is 
strengthening its deterrence measures as an urgent priority for Alliance security. These 
steps should be framed as part of a double-track strategy that, over time, will encourage 
Russia to abide by international norms – not through blandishments, but through trans-
atlantic unity and strength. This will require sustained political commitment, backed 
up by military and diplomatic resources. Germany and the US should lead within NATO 
the development of a durable new balance of deterrence and dialogue that will sustain 
Alliance cohesion and establish conditions for lasting peace in Europe. 
 
Throughout its history, NATO has had two 
principal tools to achieve its goal of safe-
guarding the security of its Allies: military 
means to assure deterrence and defence, 
and political means to pursue détente and 
dialogue. Since the crisis in Ukraine, the 
dialogue track with Russia has been largely 
frozen. In April 2014, NATO stopped prac-
tical civilian and military cooperation in 
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Although 
an NRC meeting will take place soon, it is 
doubtful that this will reverse the situation 
quickly. Contacts outside NATO channels 
have focussed mainly on pressing global 
issues where there is some commonality of 
interest, such as the Iran nuclear pro-
gramme, or an overriding necessity for 
dialogue, as with the Syrian civil war. 
As NATO implements the reassurance 
and adaptation measures decided at the 
2014 Wales summit and prepares for the 
2016 Warsaw summit, there are growing 
calls to also reactivate the dialogue dimen-
sion in order to redevelop the traditional 
twin approach of deterrence and détente. 
It is hence essential to understand how 
deterrence/defence and détente/dialogue 
reinforce each other, what lessons the past 
teaches, and what adaptations are appro-
priate for the current situation. 
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The Harmel Approach 
Security is the result of both deterrence and 
dialogue. The most robust defence, without 
political contact between adversaries, would 
risk misunderstood signals, unintentional 
provocation and escalation, greater insta-
bility, and, as a result, greater insecurity. 
Similarly, confronted with an adversary that 
is willing to move borders by force and that 
fundamentally rejects central elements of 
the post-Helsinki and post-Cold War acquis – 
especially the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and 
the 1990 Charter of Paris – dialogue with-
out defence would be dangerous folly. The 
Alliance has struck such balances since its 
creation. The foundational understandings 
for that were articulated nearly 50 years ago 
in the Harmel Report, named after its author, 
Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. 
Harmel identifies two essential functions 
of the Alliance. The first is “to maintain ad-
equate military strength and political soli-
darity to deter aggression […] and to defend 
the territory of member countries.” This 
necessitates “a suitable military capability 
to assure the balance of forces, thereby 
creating a climate of stability, security and 
confidence.” The second follows from that: 
“In this climate the Alliance can carry out 
its second function, to pursue the search 
for progress towards a more stable relation-
ship in which the underlying political issues 
can be solved.” Thus, deterrence/defence 
and détente/dialogue are complementary 
and intrinsically linked, but there is a clear 
sequence: dialogue can only be pursued if 
deterrence is assured. 
Both key functions seek to avoid war, yet 
with different means. Deterrence is a mili-
tary strategy: it refers to a military threat 
and uses military means. It consists in 
having a military capability, and the intent 
to use it, sufficient to convince a potential 
adversary that the risks of using force so 
clearly outweigh the potential gains that 
the other will choose peace over war. 
Détente uses different means, such as 
tension reduction and partial cooperation, 
through things such as legal agreements, 
verbal de-escalation, dialogue, and routine 
diplomacy. The aim is to improve predict-
ability, responsiveness, and stability, there-
by helping to avoid war. Yet, détente is not 
an end in itself. Harmel identified NATO’s 
“ultimate political purpose” as achieving 
“a just and lasting peaceful order […] accom-
panied by appropriate security guarantees.” 
It is thus essential for all Allies to have a 
shared vision of how to achieve that goal. 
Otherwise, the dialogue to achieve it risks 
becoming a divisive issue and might even 
heighten some Allies’ perceptions of insecu-
rity.  
Harmel Applied: The Cold War 
The Harmel leitmotiv substantially marked 
NATO’s strategy during the Cold War. The 
December 1979 “dual-track” decision was 
grounded in the growing Soviet superiority 
in certain (nuclear) capabilities, whereas 
Western forces had remained static. This 
Soviet theatre superiority, it was feared, 
could undermine NATO’s deterrence strat-
egy. The dual-track decision shifted the 
balance in favour of deterrence, building 
on the first pillar of Harmel (defence) by 
modernising NATO forces, while simulta-
neously expressing the ultimate aim of 
achieving a stable balance through mutual 
limitations on those very same systems on 
the basis of political agreements (dialogue). 
The result was the 1987 Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which 
eliminated that entire category of nuclear 
weapons: the very outcome that was identi-
fied in the dual-track decision as the goal. 
There is thus a 20-year arc from Harmel 
through the dual-track decision to INF that 
achieved the West’s security goals – not 
through defence alone, but through deter-
rence and defence that enabled a dialogue, 
thereby producing greater security with 
fewer armaments. 
Modernising Harmel 
If a combination of deterrence and dialogue 
is the prescription for security in Europe, a 
crucial question is how to adapt it to post-
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2014 Europe. Allies have a clear interest in 
preventing military escalation by Russia, bol-
stering stability, and increasing predictabil-
ity in the Euro-Atlantic area to re-establish 
a peaceful order. The task of the upcoming 
NATO summit in Warsaw is thus to assure 
that the deterrence and defence component 
of NATO’s policy is sufficient to entice Rus-
sia to engage seriously in a dialogue that 
advances security on accepted principles. 
Allies closest to Russia in particular fear 
that the current deterrence measures are 
not sufficient. They see an increased vulner-
ability of NATO as a result of the conven-
tional imbalance in north-east Europe, 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its military 
modernisation, and the massive “snap” 
exercises that put upwards of 100,000 
troops near NATO borders. Allies likewise 
are worried by Russia’s nuclear moderni-
sation, its public nuclear sabre-rattling, 
exercises that practice the escalation from 
conventional to nuclear conflict, alleged 
violations of the INF treaty, and its growing 
ability to deny access in the Baltic and 
Black seas as well as the Arctic. The Warsaw 
summit will seek to remedy that perceived 
imbalance and be a “deterrence” summit. 
Yet, NATO should not depend only on 
deterrence. Although it is certainly essen-
tial for ensuring peace in circumstances 
marked by confrontation, peace by deter-
rence alone carries significant risks of mis-
calculation, escalation, and unintentional 
conflict. Thus, the Warsaw summit should 
be one that improves the prospect of dia-
logue on the basis of improved deterrence. 
Alliance unity is the precondition for 
successful deterrence and exploring dia-
logue. Yet, it is perhaps more complicated 
to achieve now than it was during the Cold 
War. NATO is larger and contains a greater 
diversity of views, be it on threat percep-
tions, defence spending, or the nature of 
the Russian regime itself. Allies disagree, 
for example, whether the instability in the 
south or the east is the most immediate 
threat. The presence of NATO troops across 
the Alliance varies as a result of the 1997 
NATO-Russia Founding Act, which ex-
pressed an intent not to deploy substantial 
combat forces permanently on the territory 
of new members. This created a division 
between old and new members that persists 
until today. In an Alliance based on consen-
sus, such divisions could endanger NATO’s 
capacity to act and to agree on a new dual-
track approach. Indeed, although general 
support for a revamped dual-track approach 
is likely, divisions will probably surface on 
three main points: 1) how strong and how 
permanent additional deterrence measures 
should be, with Allies such as Poland and 
the Baltics being more demanding, whereas 
others, such as Germany, might accept 
higher numbers but insist on the rotational 
character of the deployments; 2) in par-
ticular, Allies bordering Russia do not see 
NATO’s deterrence being sufficiently bol-
stered to enable dialogue; support for the 
dialogue track is likely to come from coun-
tries such as Germany and the US; 3) there 
is disagreement about how eastwards-
looking NATO’s military adaption should 
be – whereas some, such as Poland and 
Romania, see a priority here, Allies from the 
southern flank, such as Italy, fear a one-
sided approach and are calling for NATO to 
better prepare for challenges in the south. 
Warsaw: A Deterrence Summit 
That Sets the Stage for Dialogue 
Redressing the corrosive deterrence 
disequilibrium is a prerequisite for NATO’s 
security, as well as for the Allies’ political 
cohesion in bringing about an eventual 
successful dialogue. In view of ensuring 
a new balance, Allies should focus on: 
1) Improving deterrence: Russia’s military 
build-up and the circumvention of the 
Vienna Document creates clear security 
risks that NATO can mitigate most directly 
through the enhanced forward presence of 
rotations of NATO forces. NATO’s strength-
ened deterrence measures at Warsaw 
should be adequate for the Alliance’s de-
fence in their own right; they can make a 
further positive contribution if they are 
also sufficient in encouraging Russia to 
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engage in dialogue and contribute to 
shoring up the security system in Europe. 
It should also be stressed that they are a 
result of the current and foreseeable secu-
rity environment, and that without a change 
in that environment, they will continue. 
This does not mean abandoning the NATO-
Russia Founding Act – although Russia has 
violated it, it is still useful, for it launched 
structures that could be used for dialogue. 
At the same time, NATO could express – as 
it did in the 1979 dual-track decision – an 
openness to discussions with Russia that 
could include transparency, inspections, 
and verifiable mutual limitations. This 
would preserve the viability of NATO’s strat-
egy if Russia does not take up the offer, while 
setting the terms of a potential dialogue. 
As key players in current reassurance 
measures, Germany and the US should sup-
port the adoption, in Warsaw, of further 
deterrence measures – which could be of 
rotational nature – and be prepared to ex-
pand their current contributions, such as 
troop numbers. They should also seek to 
convince other Allies to increase their con-
tributions. 
 
2) Defining the potential for dialogue: 
Dialogue requires a partner. Yet, there are 
serious doubts about Russia’s credibility, 
given its flagrant violations of international 
law and the principles of European secu-
rity. Moscow has shown little interest in 
discussing transparency or arms control 
and has not made substantial propositions. 
Rather, its sabre-rattling attitude and mili-
tary build-up seem to point in the opposite 
direction. This should not impede Allies 
from coupling a strengthened force posture 
with an openness to dialogue; yet, it dem-
onstrates how difficult the task ahead will 
be. Any dialogue should thus take place 
without illusions and acknowledge that 
Russia may seek to use dialogue to sow dis-
sension and divide NATO members rather 
than to promote security and stability. 
Therefore, Allies should agree on a set of 
principles that would undergird future 
bilateral and multilateral engagements 
with Russia, otherwise the impetus to re-
start a dialogue in the hope of managing 
tensions will outpace NATO’s ability inter-
nally to rationalise it and maintain unity. 
In the near term, this suggests a prag-
matic engagement with Moscow with 
modest expectations; not a partnership 
with shared values. It can reduce the likeli-
hood of military escalation and increase 
reliability. The network of contacts with 
Russia is not going to be reactivated in the 
foreseeable future – but precisely in times 
of crisis, dialogue must be maintained in 
order to keep possibilities of de-escalation 
open. In the short term, informal channels 
should be used, such as the meetings be-
tween NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg 
and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. This 
could be backed up by track-two initiatives 
to explore room for further discussions. 
Practical technical steps can be agreed to 
avoid unintentional military escalation, 
such as the military-level crisis contact 
mechanism proposed by German Foreign 
Minister Steinmeier. NATO should also 
highlight the contribution that transparen-
cy measures such as the Vienna Document 
have made, and support its modernisation 
under Germany’s OSCE chairmanship in 
areas such as lower thresholds for exercise 
notifications, expanded quotas for inspec-
tions, and provisions to address “snap” exer-
cises. Beyond those immediate goals, the 
achievement of mutually agreed limits on 
force levels – backed up by detailed data 
exchange and inspections – would make a 
significant contribution to security and sta-
bility. All of these measures would reinforce 
the existing principles of European security 
rather than revise them. 
Dialogue plays an essential role in manag-
ing what has become an adversarial relation-
ship. The West’s prospects for an acceptable 
outcome are greatest when NATO’s force 
presence and posture, signalling, dialogue, 
and declaratory policy are aligned into a 
coherent whole. 
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